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The three pillars of stability: legitimation, repression, and co-optation in 
autocratic regimes 
Johannes Gerschewski* 
Research Unit “Democracy: Structures, Performance, Challenges”, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB), 
Berlin, Germany 
 
Why do some autocracies remain stable while others collapse? This article presents a theoretical 
framework that seeks to explain the longevity of autocracies by referring to three pillars of stability: 
legitimation, repression, and co-optation. These three causal factors are derived by distilling and 
synthesizing the main arguments of classic and more recent research efforts. Particular emphasis is 
paid to re-incorporate legitimation in the explanation of stable autocracies. The article 
conceptionalizes the three pillars and discusses methods of concrete measurement. It then moves on 
to explain the stabilization process. How do these pillars develop their stabilizing effect? It is argued 
that reinforcement processes take place both within and between the pillars. They take the form of 
exogenous reinforcement, self-reinforcement, and reciprocal reinforcement. To illustrate the inner 
logic of these processes, I draw on empirical examples. I also state what we would need to observe 
empirically and how we can approach the three pillars methodically. A theoretical framework of this 
nature has two advantages: it is able to take the complexity of autocratic regimes into account while 
remaining parsimonious enough to be applicable to all autocratic regimes, irrespective of their 
subtype; and it integrates a static view to explain stability, with the emphasis on the underlying 
stabilization mechanisms and facilitates within-case and cross-case comparisons. 
Keywords:   autocracy  ·  stability  ·   legitimation  ·   repression  ·  co-optation 
 
What makes autocracies endure? 
In 1996, in a widely cited article, Adam Przeworski and his colleagues asked “what makes 
democracies endure?” They came to the conclusion that it was mainly economic performance and 
the institutional choice of parliamentarism that contributes decisively to the longevity of 
democracies.1 Their article stands in a long tradition, and while the research on democracy and 
democratization has produced an abundance of theories and empirical results, the research on 
autocratic political regimes as the “counterpart” to democracies has not moved beyond the classics 
of the 1960s and 1970s.2 This changed as the “third wave of democratization” ebbed away and 
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the widespread optimism both in politics and political science was replaced by a more sobering 
assessment. Stable autocracies came more and more to the forefront of scholarly attention. New and 
innovative answers to long-standing problems have been recently proposed to shed light on the 
logics of autocracies.3 This article is located within this lively ongoing debate and asks what, in turn, 
makes autocracies endure? 
The main aim is to propose a theoretical framework for the analysis of stable autocratic regimes.4 It 
tries to synthesize the main arguments that have been brought forward in both the classics in 
autocracy research and in more recent studies regarding why many autocracies have remained 
stable. It will be argued that the stability of all autocracies – irrespective of their subtype – can be 
explained with reference to what might be aptly called the three pillars of stability: legitimation, 
repression, and co-optation.5 
These three pillars are not there from the outset, but need to develop over time. How do they get 
built, that is how can we make sense theoretically of the stabilization process? I argue that 
reinforcement processes take place both within and between the pillars. These processes can take 
different forms: an exogenous reinforcement process that is propelled by the available power and 
material resources of the ruling regime; an endogenous self-reinforcement process that triggers 
path-dependency; and, lastly, a reciprocal reinforcement process that leads to a complementarity 
advantage between the pillars. I suggest that these three processes should be studied closely for 
explaining the stabilization of autocratic regimes. 
A theoretical framework of this kind has, in my view, two advantages. First, it is capable of taking the 
complexity of autocracies into account while remaining parsimonious enough to be applicable to all 
autocratic regimes. Second, it integrates a static view to explain stability with a more dynamic 
perspective to look closely at the stabilization processes and, as a result, facilitates both within-case 
and cross-case comparisons. 
The remainder of the article is structured as follows: the second section conducts a review of the 
literature to identify the three main pillars. The third section engages in concept-building and 
operationalizes their specifications in more detail. Against this backdrop, I theorize in the fourth 
section how these three pillars come into being, before drawing a conclusion in the final section. 
 
What does the literature say? 
Why are legitimation, repression, and co-optation key to the stability of autocracies? To answer this, 
a review of the literature will lay open different strands of explanatory schemes that can be 
integrated within one comprehensive and coherent framework. Broadly speaking, three research 
waves can be identified: the totalitarianism paradigm until the mid-1960s that highlighted ideology 
and terror; the rise of authoritarianism until the 1980s that placed more emphasis on socio-economic 
factors; and, starting with Geddes' seminal article in 1999, a renaissance of autocracy research that 
centred mostly on strategic repression and co-optation. 
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First wave, 1930s–1960s: the totalitarianism paradigm 
Starting with early works in the 1930s,6 the use of the concept of totalitarianism to characterize a 
new social phenomenon became widespread. The benchmark study – at least within political science 
– is still the study conducted by Friedrich and Brzezinski.7 In the 1950s, they proposed their famous 
“six-point catalogue” for identifying totalitarian regimes.8 The creation of a “new man” was 
stipulated by an all-encompassing ideology with strong chiliastic and utopian fervour and was 
implemented by the use of terror, by propaganda measures and a strong party.9 While Friedrich and 
Brzezinski's argument is structuralist in character, Hannah Arendt's work was a socio-philosophical 
attempt to understand the essence of totalitarianism.10 In her work, she highlighted what she 
identified as the two main features of totalitarian Herrschaft: ideology and terror. She saw 
totalitarianism, with its attempt to atomize society, as the radical negation of what she understood 
as the political. In a similar vein, a strong emphasis on ideology and terror was also underlined in a 
third approach. Totalitarian movements have been compared to political religion in order to explain 
their “tremendum et fascinosum”.11 
However, in the 1960s, the totalitarianism paradigm faced mounting critique. In addition to criticizing 
its inherent statism, Barber also complained about the fuzzy conceptual foundations of the term.12 
Given the scarcity of empirical cases, this led to a situation in which totalitarianism was increasingly 
edged out by the concept of authoritarianism. 
 
Second wave, 1960s–1980s: the rise of authoritarianism 
The concept of authoritarianism had more modest beginnings. Juan Linz claimed in 1964 that 
Francoist Spain should not be studied through the lenses of totalitarianism, but that authoritarianism 
constituted a new and distinct phenomenon.13 The rise of authoritarianism as a distinct regime type 
began, with O'Donnell's study on “bureaucratic authoritarianism” as the most prominent one.14 In 
brief, O'Donnell argued that, due to the fact that Argentina and Brazil reached limits in their import 
substitution strategy, bureaucratic elites from the military and business that became increasingly 
frustrated with the political and economic circumstances emerged. In response to the perceived 
crisis, they formed a coup coalition that finally established an authoritarian regime and sought 
economic progress and state order. Although his explanations encountered difficulties in travelling to 
other Latin American countries, he emphasized a point that had previously been overshadowed: the 
socio-economic dimension functioned both as a driver for the emergence and the maintenance of 
authoritarian regimes.15 I will take up this explanatory factor later in the discussion about “specific 
support”.16 
Two other trends are worth considering within this wave: a proliferation of subtypes and a 
“regionalization” of explanations.17 Especially in Latin America and Southeast Asia, military regimes 
emerged in the 1960s and 1970s that were characterized by the persistent political role of the 
military and that acted behind 
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a quasi-civilian façade. Simultaneously, sub-Saharan Africa experienced an increase in one-party 
regimes, while the autocracies in many Arab countries began to build their stability on neo-
patrimonial rule and a “social contract” between the rulers and the ruled.18 
What all these explanations have in common is that they varied greatly from the totalitarianism 
paradigm and searched for more nuanced and tailored explanations for new (regional) phenomena. 
The quintessence was that autocrats cannot rely solely on ideology and terror, but also need to 
deliver improved socio-economic performances, sometimes focused in informal reward policies. 
 
Third wave: a renaissance in studies of autocracies 
The third wave of autocracy research started after a time lag. It was not until the seminal article by 
Barbara Geddes in 1999 that scholarly attention returned to questions surrounding autocracies.19 
Most prominently, neo-institutionalist approaches have recently entered the research on autocracies 
and have highlighted the stabilizing effect of institutions.20 The role of political parties, legislatures, 
and elections as co-optation mechanisms has been of particular importance. In older research, 
elections and legislatures were seen as mere window dressing and parties were mainly reduced to 
entities that “provide a following for the dictator”.21 Gandhi and Przeworski go beyond this reasoning 
and argue that autocratic rulers do make systematic use of these seemingly democratic institutions 
to prolong their rule.22 In particular, it has been demonstrated that one-party regimes are more 
robust than other regimes. Parties seem to have a stabilizing effect on autocratic rule, as they can 
settle and mediate intra-elite conflicts.23 Also, elections serve as a tool for co-optation. They provide 
information for the national leaders regarding the loyalty and competence of regional and local 
incumbents.24 
In contrast to the repressive abuse in totalitarian regimes, Acemoglu and Robinson compellingly 
point out that strategic and, in game-theoretic language, “optimal” degrees of repression play a 
particularly decisive role in the longevity of autocratic regimes.25 In their rational choice approach, a 
second topic is of special interest: intra-elite cohesion. The underlying premise here is that all 
autocratic regimes have to share power in an insecure environment, in which any defection must be 
avoided by the (threat of the) use of force. The latent danger of intra-elite splits must be tackled. Co-
opting institutions are crucial here, as they alleviate moral hazard problems.26 
To conclude, while the totalitarianism paradigm especially emphasized the use of terror and the role 
of political ideologies, subsequent studies have differed in their research focus. Socio-economic 
conditions, as well as more informal characteristics of authoritarian rule, have come to the forefront 
and have largely dominated the discourse. In the last decade, the stabilizing effect that strategic 
repression and formal institutions like elections, legislatures, and parties have in shoring up an intra-
elite cohesion have been analysed more rigorously. Table 1 provides an overview. 
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In order to synthesize these different strands in one coherent analytical framework, I propose the 
three pillars of legitimation, repression, and co-optation. I argue that they are able to thwart the 
danger of regime breakdown that could stem from three sources: from the ordinary citizens whose 
non-compliance usually takes the form of popular uprisings and rebellions; from oppositional actors 
that organize resistance; and lastly from intra-elite splits in which strategically important elites 
deviate from the ruling elite's course.27 The conceptualization, operationalization, and methods of 
concrete measurement are dealt with in the following section. 
 
The concepts: legitimation, repression, and co-optation 
Reincorporating legitimation in the study of autocracies 
Recent research efforts have gradually lost sight of the legitimation dimension. As shown above, 
legitimation was at the core of classic studies. Closely linked to the demise of the totalitarianism 
paradigm, it currently plays only a secondary role. Contemporary critiques come from three sides: 
normative, substantive, and methodical. Normatively, it is argued that a “legitimate autocracy” 
constitutes nothing more than an oxymoron. Substantively, it is claimed that legitimation simply does 
not matter for the stability of autocracies, as such regimes do not need to rely on people's support.28 
And lastly, from a more pragmatic viewpoint, the methodical challenges in measuring legitimation in 
autocratic settings remain unsolved. 
These are good reasons. However, I argue that we miss an important causal factor when we bracket 
out legitimation. Instead, I make the case for re-incorporating it into the explanation of stable 
autocracies. Taking up the aforementioned critique, legitimation will be defined here as the process 
of gaining support which is based on an empirical, Weberian tradition of “legitimacy belief”.29 It is 
then free from normative connotations and therefore does not run counter to the oxymoron 
criticism. This was exactly Weber's aim. He attempted to classify political rule without reference to 
normative judgments that are supposed to be the “right” rule. Legitimation seeks to guarantee active 
consent, compliance with the rules, passive obedience, or mere toleration within the population. 
The substantial critique puts the relevance of legitimation for maintaining stability into question. 
However, Rousseau's famous dictum that even the strongest needs to transform strength into right, 
as he would be never strong enough to be always the master, applies to the autocratic context as 
well. I explicitly start from the assumption that behind every political order there must be a 
“legitimacy idea”.30 Today's autocracies cannot rely (at least in the long term) entirely on their abuse 
of power in a strictly hierarchical, pyramid-shaped political order as the unconstrained tyrants of the 
past – from whom all power was derived – might have done. Wittfogel's old idea of an “oriental 
despotism”, in which the elite can regulate the access to water and can so rule unboundedly in a 
“hydraulic society”, does not seem to be suitable for today's autocracies.31 Instead, they are 
characterized by many more interdependencies between the ruler and the ruled. 
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Even now, only anecdotal evidence is available as to why legitimation matters. A more solid 
theoretical basis is needed. For illustrative purposes it might suffice here to refer to the basic logic in 
different empirical cases. Regime maintenance in the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) 
has, for example, been explained by a mixture of charismatic and rational legitimacy beliefs. Despite 
all mobilization efforts, this legitimacy belief was ironically held by an emergent apolitical middle 
class, whose reference points were the family or colleagues from work, instead of focusing on “high 
politics”. Yet when the regime came under mounting pressure in the 1970s to give up its utopian 
promises and focus more closely on performance criteria, it failed to “deliver”. The GDR's weak spot 
was the citizens' disenchantment and perception of a growing discrepancy between the official 
ideological claims and the social reality that finally led to its breakdown.32 A similar pattern can be 
seen contemporaneously in the so-called “Arab Spring”. For a long time, these populist authoritarian 
states were said to rely on a “social contract”: a reciprocal relationship that guaranteed political 
acquiescence in return for relatively acceptable economic performances.33 Due to growing 
disillusionment, the ruled people in Tunisia and Egypt withdrew from this “social contract” and 
protested. From Mexico we know, following Magaloni's study, that the monopolist Partido 
Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) gained public support in times of economic growth and that 
Mexicans “voted for autocracy” for decades; it was only the younger generation, who had not 
experienced the times of economic stability, which finally dumped the PRI from office in 2000.34 
Alternatively, take the case of the People's Republic of China, in which the ruling Communist Party 
(CP) was very successful in (re)gaining public legitimacy after the Tiananmen protests in 1989 by 
using a mixture of economic performance, nationalism, and ideology.35 These exemplary empirical 
cases do not, however, provide systematic evidence; a broader comparative study of legitimation in 
autocracies is still pending. But these cases illustrate the crucial importance for autocratic regimes to 
build a strong legitimizing basis. 
The examples also suggest that autocratic regimes are more performance-dependent than is often 
assumed. For a long time, the legitimation dimension has been equated with “ideocracies” like Cuba 
or North Korea and “theocracies” like Iran.36 The underlying idea was that massive indoctrination 
turns citizens into “true believers”. However, it seems that autocratic regimes cannot maintain a 
utopian ideology and shield the people from external influences over a longer period. The 
indoctrination mechanism reaches its limits. Even North Korea, globally the most reclusive state, has 
growing problems maintaining its informational monopoly and needs to legitimate its rule more 
strongly with reference to its nuclear ambitions.37 Such as in the case of the GDR, ideocracies arrive 
sooner or later at a state in which they need to deliver. This can turn out to be the Trojan horse for 
the autocratic elite and makes them more vulnerable to people's assessments.38 Therefore, we 
should go beyond the reasoning of the intensity of ideological indoctrination and include 
performance and output legitimation as a different legitimation source in our studies.39 I propose 
that the old Eastonian 
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distinction between “diffuse” and “specific support” captures the concept of legitimation most 
appropriately. 
“Specific support” can be defined as the “quid pro quo for the fulfilment of demands”,40 and 
particularly includes the performance orientation. As has been emphasized in the second wave of 
autocracy research, autocracies have to address popular demands for socio-economic development 
and physical security. Besides economic conditions, specific support can also stem from the state's 
ability to maintain internal order and social security. “Diffuse support” refers to what the regime 
“actually is or represents”.41 In contrast to specific support, it is more general and long-term-
oriented. Diffuse support of this nature can stem from both the political ideologies that have been 
the main focus in classic totalitarian research, and also from religious, nationalistic, or traditional 
claims, from the charisma of autocratic leaders as well as from external threats that lead to domestic 
rally-around-the-flag effects.42 
One challenge remains. Even if we agree to have good reasons to reincorporate legitimation in the 
study of autocracies, how can we measure it? For specific support, we can assume, in line with the 
conceptual discussion that the regime needs to deliver. The better it performs economically, socially, 
and in terms of public order, the more legitimate it is in the eyes of the ruled. The rulers fulfil the 
social contract. Adequate performance indicators are existent and can also be aggregated to specific 
indices.43 
The different World Bank Development Indicators, such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth 
rates, inflation rates, growth of energy consumption/capita, but also vehicles per capita or 
telephones and televisions per capita, are good indicators for the economic performance of the 
regime. The growth or decline in social, health, and educational expenditures, the GINI index for 
social inequality, the school enrolment per capita and the literacy rate, the physicians per capita, or 
the overall Human Development Index (HDI) are adequate indicators that can be used for measuring 
specific support.44 To what extent the promise to guarantee internal security and public order has 
been kept can be measured by proxy-indicators like the number of riots, strikes, guerrilla warfare, or 
the country's crime rate.45 
Diffuse legitimation is without doubt a harder nut to crack.46 Measuring legitimation in democracies 
routinely relies on survey data about people's attitudes. For autocracies, this kind of data is either 
unreliable, as it faces the problem of preference falsification, or simply does not exist. How can we 
evaluate how successful an ideology has been? Three routes to come closer to the degree of diffuse 
support can be proposed. First, the number and intensity of public protests can be taken as a proxy-
indicator for societal discontent. This route would not derive its informative value from people's 
attitude, but more from its empirically observable behaviour.47 The higher the number of protests, 
the less a regime is legitimized. However, two problems arise: on the one hand, protest data just 
measures the absence of legitimation and is therefore “one-sided”; on the other hand, public 
protests depend on the population's ability to protest in the first place, that is the weakening of 
repression. Therefore, repression needs to be discounted. A second route for approximating a 
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legitimation measure can be via qualitative assessments of country experts or assessments in 
secondary literature, which are both labour-intensive tasks. Third, official legitimacy claims by the 
ruling elite can be taken more seriously and can be classified by using content analysis techniques. 
Under the premise that the ruling elite must also keep its ideological promises in autocratic settings, 
a perceived gap between the promises and the social reality erodes the legitimation basis for the 
autocratic elite. 
 
Repression as the backbone of autocracies 
Repression is undoubtedly one of the backbones of autocracies and is sometimes even referred to as 
a defining feature of autocracies. Yet repression alone cannot account for the longevity of 
autocracies. Repression is too costly a way to maintain stability in the long run; as the pointed saying 
attributed to Talleyrand goes, you can do anything with bayonets except sit on them. Following 
Davenport, repression can be defined as the “actual or threatened use of physical sanctions against 
an individual or organization, within the territorial jurisdiction of the state, for the purpose of 
imposing a cost on the target as well as deterring specific activities”.48 Its main function lies in 
channelling public demands vis-à-vis the political system in a way that these demands do not 
endanger the autocratic regime. 
In operationalizing the concept, I will make use of the instructive distinction by Levitsky and Way 
between “high” and “low intensity” repression.49 In their work they distinguish repression according 
to the targeted people or institution and the form of violence used. Against this backdrop, high 
intensity coercion can be defined as visible acts that are targeted either at well-known individuals like 
opposition leaders, at a larger number of people, or at major oppositional organizations. Concrete 
measures include the (violent) repression of mass demonstrations, (violent) campaigns against 
parties, and the attempted assassination or imprisonment of opposition leaders. Lower intensity 
coercion would then aim at groups of minor importance, is less visible, and often takes more subtle 
forms. Concrete measures can be the use of (formal and informal) surveillance apparatus, low 
intensity physical harassment and intimidation, and also non-physical forms such as the denial of 
certain job and education opportunities as well as the curtailment of political rights like the freedom 
of assembly. The measurement of repression is straightforward as data is available. The distinction 
by Freedom House (FH) between “political rights” and “civil liberties” mirror to some extent the 
distinction between harder and softer forms of repression. The Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights 
Dataset (CIRI) is, however, arguably more suitable, as it makes the composition of its indices 
transparent and so allows for the construction of separate indices. CIRI's distinction between its 
“New Empowerment Index” and the “Physical Rights Index” captures low and high intensity 
repression correspondingly. A third alternative database would be the Political Terror Scale (PTS) 
project, which bases its assessments on the yearly reports by Amnesty International and the US State 
Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.50 
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The third pillar: co-optation 
I define co-optation as the capacity to tie strategically-relevant actors (or a group of actors) to the 
regime elite. In Bueno de Mesquita's terms, members of the “selectorate” need to be bound to the 
“winning coalition”.51 Co-optation needs to be exerted so that the actor is “persuaded not to exercise 
his power to obstruct” and instead to use the resources in line with the ruling elite's demands.52 The 
“players” in this “autocratic subgame” are on the intra-elite level. Military and business elites of 
strategic importance need to be co-opted.53 The function of co-optation can be characterized as 
inclusionary. It works as a transmission belt to ensure both the intra-elite cohesion and the steering 
capacity of the political elite. The ability of the political elite to maintain the balance between 
competing subordinate actors and to avoid a situation in which one actor grows too strong by 
simultaneously tying all relevant actors to the regime is crucial for the stability of autocracies. 
As discussed above, Gandhi and Przeworski make a strong case for co-optation via formal channels.54 
Prima facie democratic institutions like parliaments, parties, or elections have vital functions for the 
co-optation of strategic elites from business or military ranks. There are, however, also informal ways 
of binding actors to the regime. In this regard, (neo) patrimonialism was already seen in the 1970s as 
the most widespread type of autocratic rule.55 This often implies that the autocratic elite rules by and 
through a close network of direct and indirect ties to subordinate actors. Patronage, clientelism, and 
corruption are the most commonly used instruments.56 
Concrete measurement again poses some challenges. There is no indicator for co-optation that can 
be taken off the shelf. Gandhi and Przeworski have introduced a “degree of institutionalization”. The 
basic idea behind this is intriguing. They argue that autocrats need to respond to their corresponding 
threat level. They use proxy-indicators like the (military or civilian) origin of the leader, the number of 
changes of the leader, the inherited parties, the percentage of other democracies in the world, and 
the mineral resource endowment as predictors for institutionalization (meaning: no parties, one 
party, or more than one party in the legislature). They then compare the number of predicted parties 
to the actual number and capture the effect of over- and under-institutionalization on dictators' 
survival.57 
To further elaborate on Gandhi and Przeworski's idea, the inclusiveness of parties might also be 
measured by the years in office of the leader's party, the government fractionalization, and the 
number of cabinet changes. When it comes to binding the military to the ruling regime, the military 
expenditures, the size of the military, and militaries in cabinets might indicate the intensity of co-
optation efforts.58 
Applying the same reasoning for informal methods, the “demand-side” of co-optation can be 
captured by the linguistic, ethnic, religious, and cultural heterogeneity measurements by Alesina and 
colleagues as well as by Fearon.59 Another powerful source is the Ethnic Power Relations Dataset.60 
However, to what extent this demand is compensated by the use of informal instruments like 
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clientelism and patronage still depends on the qualitative assessment of country experts. To my 
knowledge, there is no suitable indicator for larger studies at hand. Given the importance of informal 
co-optation, to systematically collect data on informal co-optation mechanisms might be a rewarding 
task for future research.61 Figure 1 illustrates the three pillars of stability. 
 
The stabilization process 
Having set out three crucial concepts – legitimation, repression, and co-optation – that, I argue, are 
causal for the stability of autocracies, we need to go one step further. Stability refers usually to a 
status quo, while stabilization refers to a process. Autocracies rest on the three pillars, but how do 
these pillars come about? The pillars are not in existence from the very beginning of the regime, but 
need to be built over time. As depicted in Table 2, I suggest that we need to focus on three processes 
that take place within and between these pillars to explain the stabilization processes:  
1) exogenous reinforcement processes that are propelled by the availability of outside power 
and material resources of the regime, but take place within the pillars; 
2) self-reinforcing processes within the pillars that lead to path-dependency; and 
 
 
Figure 1. The three pillars of stability (adapted from Gerschewski et al., “Warum überleben 
Diktaturen”).
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3) reciprocal reinforcement processes and the emergence of complementarity advantages 
between the pillars. 
 
In the following section, I will theorize on these processes, explicitly spell out what we would need to 
observe if the theory holds, and draw on empirical cases for illustrative purposes. 
 
Reinforcing autocratic rule within the pillars 
In order to adequately theorize the time-dimensional character of the process within the pillars, I 
borrow insights from the rich neo-institutional literature.62 In order to uncover their stabilizing effect, 
I argue that the three pillars need to be institutionalized over time.63 The criss-crossing of multiple 
interactions that take place within the “arena” of legitimation, repression, and co-optation needs to 
go beyond a mere situational and ad hoc basis and needs to develop into stable institutions. In this 
sense, institutions are here understood as behavioural patterns. They are “compliance procedures 
and standard operating practices that structure the relationship between individuals”.64 
Institutionalized legitimation means that citizens have internalized the legitimating norm; 
institutionalized repression would mean that oppositional actors are structurally prevented from 
revolting; and institutionalized co-optation represents an interaction between political elite on the 
one hand and business and military elites on the other hand, in which cooperation benefits outweigh 
the costs. But how does the institutionalization process take place? 
In answering this question, I identify two different processes within the pillars. The first one is the 
more widespread and “normal” case of an exogenously reinforced institutionalization. The second 
one is theoretically very appealing, but empirically rarer: a self-reinforcing institutionalization process 
in the case of increasing returns. The distinction is drawn for analytical clarity, but should not rule out 
the possibility that these logics change, and sometimes parallel. 
The most common and intuitive form of institutionalization refers to a process that is not self-
sustaining, but needs to be propelled externally, that is in our case from outside the pillars. 
Legitimation, repression, and co-optation have no in-built self-reinforcing mechanism, but they are in 
need of constant external drive. Therefore they are more vulnerable and dependent on the 
availability of external resources. The power and material resources determine the limits of the 
institutionalization process. If the political regime elites are no longer able, due to hard budget 
constraints and/or declining power resources, to foster legitimation within the population, to uphold 
a functioning repression apparatus, or to distribute enough material benefits to co-opt strategic 
actors in a sufficient way, the institutionalization process within the pillars comes to a halt. To use a 
metaphor, the ruling regime acts like a plate spinner who needs to hold the plates (the institutions) 
in motion constantly, otherwise the plates fall, and the institutionalization process ends.65 
The second form of institutionalization process refers to path-dependent explanations. Once an 
institution is set on track, the path is difficult to alter and 
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reinforces itself. Mahoney has proposed different mechanisms of self-reinforcement: a legitimation 
mechanism that reproduces itself “because actors believe it is morally just or appropriate”;66 a 
mechanism based on power asymmetries; and a utilitarian mechanism that reproduces itself due to 
corresponding cost-benefit calculations.67 These three mechanisms can be adopted. Legitimation can 
reinforce itself due to the nurturing of people's supporting attitudes vis-à-vis the regime. Repression 
functions by reproducing power asymmetries between the ruler and the opposition. Co-optation can 
be seen as more strategic action, in which both the ruling elite and the elite to be co-opted weigh 
their individual costs and benefits. 
In line with Mahoney, I argue that these mechanisms are self-reinforcing, which leads to path-
dependency, and also concur with him that, for analytical added value, we need to go beyond a 
“history-matters” argument. I part company, however, when it comes to show this phenomenon 
empirically. I suggest narrowing down path-dependency to demonstrate that these mechanisms 
exhibit increasing returns.68 Stemming originally from economics, increasing returns occur when a 
change of one unit on the explanatory side is followed by a change of more than one unit on the 
explanandum. In other words, the marginal costs that occur when “producing” one more unit 
decrease with growing numbers of the product. The marginal cost curve is convex and monotonically 
decreasing. 
Although path-dependency is often posited in social science explanations, it is much rarer than the 
aforementioned exogenously-propelled institutionalizations. But what would we need to observe 
empirically? How can we know if a process is self-reinforcing, instead of being reproduced by 
exogenous sources? This indeed poses a challenge, but increasing returns and therefore self-
reinforcement processes can occur when we observe the following: 
1) High fixed or set-up costs that are amortized with growing numbers and that result in a 
situation in which subsequent investments in alternative projects become costlier, 
sometimes even ruling them out. 
2) Learning and coordination effects due to additional knowledge or experience make the 
production process more efficient, so that costs decrease and higher returns are to be 
expected. 
3) The creation of adaptive expectations refers to the effect of anticipation. Actors form their 
future expectations on the base of current information and adapt their behaviour to it, with 
self-fulfilling effects. If a person projects, for example, that the use of one technology will 
supersede an alternative, then s/he acts in a way that means that this comes true. 
4) The network effect refers to the benefits of a network good that increases disproportionally 
with the number of users of this good, for example a telephone’s benefit increases from four 
and five users by 12 to 20 possible connections. 
Let me illustrate this with some empirical examples. The diffusion of a “legitimacy belief” can be 
understood as a network good that is mostly connected to high 
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initial start-up costs that trigger subsequent investments and make alternatives costlier, sometimes 
even crowding them out. Take the case of North Korea. While in the 1950s, a limited pluralism of 
Weltanschauungen was still observable, the rapid spread of the Juche ideology after its first public 
mentioning in 1955 is a good case in point. While initial propaganda efforts sidelined and catalyzed 
the dissemination of the Juche idea, its spread was at least to some extent self-reinforcing. Adding 
new believers as nodes to the network led to a disproportional increase in the network's 
countrywide coverage. The possible connections within this belief network increased sharply, leading 
to a reduction of marginal “persuasion costs”.69 
Repression can also be interpreted as a network good whose dynamic institutionalization process is 
self-reinforcing. Analogous to telephones or railways, the regime elite tries to infiltrate and penetrate 
society. Following the famous dictum of Mussolini that the party should be the capillary organization 
of the regime,70 adding one new regime party office or one security police facility in the country can 
increase its benefit for the regime beyond the one unit that is invested. To stick to the North Korean 
example, the institutionalization of the repression and surveillance apparatus at the end of the 1950s 
can be interpreted as following this network logic of repression. Within a relatively short period of 
time, a dense network of prison camps of various types and societal controlling mechanisms were 
installed all over the country, which made the repression mechanism – at least temporarily – self-
reinforcing. In addition, coordination effects not just facilitated, but also reinforced, the construction 
and maintenance of the North Korean repression apparatus. Secret Service, Secret Police, the 
Ministry for Public Security, the Ministry of State Security, and the Ministry of Defence began to 
coordinate their work in the 1950s, which led to increasing returns.71 
Learning and coordination effects might be detected in autocracies' co-optation efforts. Hlaing 
argues persuasively for the Burmese case that the Tatmadaw, the military organization, has 
undergone a stabilizing process after its electoral defeat in 1988 and the withdrawal of Ne Win. The 
way the co-optation mechanisms have been balanced out and fine-tuned over the last two decades 
suggests that a case for path-dependency and organizational learning can be made here as well. The 
Burmese junta institutionalized a system of collecting incriminating evidence against military officers 
in the event that they were to be disciplined. Moreover, they perfected the rule of “reserving” 
discrete domains of operation, which gave officers enough benefit to remain loyal to the regime 
while none of them got too powerful.72 In this light, co-optation, repression, and legitimation were 
not just exogenously propelled by the regime elite via huge material investments, but their 
institutionalization also had internal and structurally in-built reasons. 
 
Reciprocal reinforcement and complementarity between the pillars 
Institutions rarely work in isolation, but are part of an institutional ensemble. The relationship 
between them can, in general, be neutral, substitutive, conflictive, or 
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complementary. I suggest complementarity between the three pillars. But what does 
complementarity mean? The most advanced conceptualizations have been offered by economic 
sociologists and comparative political economists.73 Höpner provides an excellent overview of the 
research fields that have adopted the concept. He concludes from the various applications that 
complementarity refers to the concurrence and co-functioning of institutions that constitute 
together a “whole”.74 In addition, I suggest a reciprocal reinforcement between the three pillars. 
This means that the existence of one pillar provokes that of another, which in turn strengthens the 
first again, etc.75 Reciprocal reinforcement stresses not just the functional interdependence, but also 
the mutual strengthening. 
In the concepts part of this article, I have touched upon the different functions of the pillars. Gaining 
diffuse and specific support from the citizens is the function of legitimation; channelling the demands 
from the opposition towards the ruling elite is secured by harder and softer forms of repression; and 
lastly, maintaining cohesion and steering capability within the elite is fulfilled through the use of 
formal and informal methods of co-optation. How can these functions be complementary and how 
can they reinforce reciprocally? 
Maintaining elite cohesion is complementary to the function of channelling oppositional demands. 
Co-opting potentially deviant elites by using formal and informal instruments reduces the danger of 
the emergence of oppositional leaders, while soft and hard repression raises the mobilization costs 
for such oppositional figures. We can assume a strong linkage between forms of repression and 
forms of co-optation. This also holds true for the relationship between co-optation and legitimation. 
Co-optation binds intra-elite actors to the ruling regime and therefore reduces the danger of an 
upcoming personal (charismatic) alternative that takes the lead in promoting an alternative 
Weltanschauung. Performance as well as ideational legitimation reduces in turn the persuasion 
costs, which make co-optation easier. 
The Achilles heel can be seen between forms of legitimation and repression. Gaining support 
decreases the potential for opposition that would need to be repressed. Reciprocally, repression 
seeks to undermine all attempts of oppositional movements for alternative legitimation sources. 
However, the linkage between these two pillars is weaker and ambivalent, as repression is a double-
edged sword. Davenport has highlighted the “punishment puzzle”, in which the impact of repression 
on public dissent has been shown as being positive, negative, or non-existent.76 Repression comes 
with unintended consequences and can weaken the legitimation function, which again brings 
repression mounting problems. This can lead to a destabilizing downward spiral. Moreover, a regime 
based on strong ideologies might be able to use both forms of repression. The ideology then serves 
as the hermeneutic frame and even justifies the use of hard repression. However, hard repression 
might prove to be incompatible with performance-based legitimation. Figure 2 displays the 
complementarity triangle. 
What might we empirically observe if the theoretical claim of reciprocal reinforcement and 
complementarity is true? Deeg is right in his assessment that 
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Figure 2. Reciprocal reinforcement and complementarity. 
complementarity presumes that the number of successful combinations of elements is limited.77 
Certain combinations of pillar specifications “go together”. They should not be randomly distributed, 
but should display systematic patterns. To test the complementarity hypothesis empirically, we 
would expect that the regimes cluster. 
Two stable configurations can be hypothesized to exist. It has been argued above that diffuse 
support via ideologies and hard repression have been the two most dominant characteristics in 
classic studies. By adding co-optation, particularly via party structures, we would arrive at one 
hypothesized stable configuration that leans toward the old totalitarian reasoning: high diffuse 
support, high soft and hard repression, and formal co-optation. This configuration can aptly be called 
an “over-politicization configuration”. We might, however, be able to overcome the idiosyncratic 
tendencies of the totalitarianism paradigm and adequately capture more empirical cases by 
simultaneously preserving some of the most valuable insights in understanding the essence of such 
an extreme and ideal-typical regime form. 
In the spirit of the work by Linz,78 a second path that can be identified is a “de-politicization 
configuration”. This configuration would exhibit a high degree of performance orientation that would 
demand more subtle and softer forms of repression as well as co-optation by informal channels, 
ranging from patronage to clientelistic networks. The result of this stabilizing combination is what 
O'Donnell has pointedly described as “low-intensity citizenship”.79 In particular, the rentier state 
approach and the literature on developmental authoritarianism 
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 that have been reviewed above have highlighted the idea of an unspoken “social contract” between 
the performing rulers and those rendered passive. 
Empirically showing that these two configurations yield complementarity advantages and therefore 
lead to stable configurations is still on the agenda for future research. Two routes for causal 
inference can be identified. Firstly, we can rely on counterfactual theories of causation and engage in 
deep case studies. We would then need to show that if there is no complementarity, then, ceteris 
paribus, the institutions would perform worse and would suffer from lower efficiency gains.80 
Secondly, we can increase causal leverage by relying on the regularity theory of causation and could 
make use of Cluster Analysis or systematic Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). If we find these 
two clusters over a large number of cases, the regularity with which a certain combination is stable 
suggests a causal relationship. The “over-politicization” and “under-politicization configuration” 
would then constitute the “two worlds of autocracies”. 
 
Concluding remarks 
When in 1975 Juan Linz wrote his classic handbook article, he was given so much space as there was 
almost no other entry or reference to non-democracies in the whole six-volume project.81 With the 
recent renaissance of autocracy studies, this has changed considerably. New insights have been 
gained; and while there are still blind spots in understanding autocratic regimes' inner logic, the 
academic debate is vital and ongoing. To place this theoretical framework within this discussion was 
the aim of the article. 
I have argued that autocratic regimes rest on three pillars. Legitimation, repression, and co-optation 
have been derived as key by extracting and synthesizing the main arguments of classic and more 
recent research efforts. I have paid special attention to re-incorporating legitimation into the studies 
of autocratic regimes, a dimension that has recently been considered less relevant. In order to 
account for the time-dependent stabilization process, I have suggested closely looking at three 
processes: exogenous reinforcement and self-reinforcement within the pillars, and reciprocal 
reinforcement between them. In this sense, the proposed theoretical framework aims at integrating 
a static view to explain stability by three causal factors, with a dynamic perspective to uncover the 
underlying reinforcement mechanisms. To think further along these lines will hopefully prove useful 
for future cross-case and within-case comparative work. 
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